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IN A R E C E N T A R T I C L E criticizing postcolonial theory's hege-
monic ambition to represent or speak for the dominated and the 
oppressed, S imon Dur ing writes: 
It is important not to forget that the postcolonial paradigm appeals 
largely to whites and diasporic Indian intellectuals working in the 
West. It does not appeal to those closest to the continuing struggle 
against white domination—to Koori activists in Australia or the 
South African PAC, say; to offer another instance, I do not think 
there is a Maori word for "postcolonialism." (348) 
I wil l return to During's remarks later in this essay, but, for the 
moment, I want to note that his statement—"I do not think there 
is a Maor i word for 'postcolonial ism'"—not only assumes lexical 
incommensurability but also forwards the argument that a con-
cept or term such as "postcolonialism" is utterly foreign and 
irrelevant to the Maoris in their struggle for autonomy and self-
determination. The Maoris, Dur ing implies, do not have a word 
for "postcolonialism" because they have no need for it. To de-
fend the Maor i struggle for autonomy from the totalizing ten-
dencies of metropolitan theory, Dur ing utilizes a strategy of 
cultural separatism. Thus, on one side, we are presented with 
Maor i culture with its specific, local concerns, and, on the other, 
we have the academic culture of postcolonial studies, with its own 
separate and distinct agenda. 
One can understand why Dur ing would want to oppose cul-
tural separatism to the perceived threat of cultural assimilation 
and domination. L ike many contemporary critics, Dur ing is sus-
picious of any discourse that seeks to explain or represent any-
thing other than itself; thus, resisting what he suspects to be a 
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universalizing tendency in metropolitan postcolonial theory, he 
invokes local cultural particularities. L ike most cultural rela-
tivists, Dur ing also fears that powerful metropolitan cultures will 
swallow up peripheral ones, thereby destroying their distinctive, 
resistant cultural identity. Prompted by such fears, well-meaning 
anthropologists, museum curators, and supporters o f indige-
nous struggles seek to protect a threatened culture by invoking, 
sometimes to the point of reifying, the culture's "authentic" 
identity. 
However, such forms of cultural protectionism ignore two 
dangers: the danger that cultural separation may turn into the 
oppressive rigidity of apartheid and the danger of identifying 
cultural authenticity with an ahistorical and exotic cultural essen-
tialism. The first danger is succincdy described by the French 
anthropologist Jean-Loup Amselle: 
Given all the philosophies of history and other sagas of human 
progress, American culturalist anthropologists along with Lévi-
Strauss were right to stress the particularist nature and the relative 
character of the values promoted by different societies. But the flip 
side of this generous attitude is the erection of impermeable cultural 
barriers that imprison each group in its own singularity.... Far from 
being an instrument of tolerance toward, and liberation of, minor-
ities as its proponents like to claim . . . [the notion of separate, 
distinct cultures] reveals instead all the wrongs of ethnological rea-
son, and that is why it has been claimed by the "new right" in France. 
To isolate a community by defining a set of characteristic "differ-
ences" can lead to the possibility of its territorial confinement. . . . 
Ethnic labeling, and the assignment of differences, are self-fulfilling 
prophecies, (qtd. in Lionnet 107) 
O n the second danger, that of regarding cultural authenticity as 
unchanging essence, the American anthropologist James Cliff-
ord has this to say: 
I am especially sceptical of an almost automatic reflex... to relegate 
exotic peoples and objects to the collective past Exotic traditions 
appear [to the modem West] as archaic, purer (and more rare) than 
the diluted inventions of a syncretic present. In this temporal setup a 
great many twentieth-century creations can only appear as imitations 
of more "developed" models. . . . Many traditions, languages, cos-
mologies, and values are lost, some literally murdered; but much has 
simultaneously been invented and revived in complex, oppositional 
contexts. If the victims of progress and empire are weak, they are 
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seldom passive. It used to be assumed, for example, that conversion 
to Christianity in Africa, Melanesia, Latin America . . . would lead to 
the extinction of indigenous cultures rather than to their transfor-
mations. Something more ambiguous and historically complex has 
occurred, requiring that we perceive both the end of certain orders of 
diversity and the creation or translation of others [We must begin 
to survey] hybrid and subversive forms of cultural representation, 
forms that prefigure an inventive future. (16-17) 
The relegation of cultural authenticity to the past in effect 
freezes or halts the process of historical and cultural change and 
denies that a culture may be open to new ideas and new ways of 
doing things or that it may develop and grow through inter-
cultural addition, adoption, or even appropriation. The attempt 
to salvage cultural authenticity can turn into the censorship 
of cultural innovation, as the following example demonstrates. 
After the Second World War, with the help of the Canadian gov-
ernment, Inuit craft-producing co-operatives were set up and 
directed to produce carvings that would be recognizably "tradi-
t ional." A non-Inuit arts-and-crafts specialist was hired to screen 
out carvings deemed unsuitable. Among those deemed unsuita-
ble was a soapstone sculpture of Elvis Presley, which escaped the 
sledge-hammer only because of the intervention of a perceptive 
official "who felt the piece reflected the reality of the Sugluk 
setdement with which he was famil iar" (Brett 122). What this 
example shows is that "cultural correctness" does not appreciate 
cultural "border-crossings" or cultural hybridization. To the arts-
and-crafts specialist, Elvis belonged firmly to the white world of 
the south, and the Inuit should only carve seals, bears, and 
hunters. It probably d id not occur to h im that Elvis, heard 
through the radio or gl impsed through magazines and news-
papers, may have been as much a part of Inuit everyday life as 
seals and bears. Moreover, he probably would have been sur-
prised to learn that Elvis was himself a cultural hybrid, a Southern 
white boy whose rock-and-roll style was derived from Black Amer-
ican music, itself a hybrid of African and European musical 
idioms. 
This phenomenon of cultural intermixing and exchange has 
been termed "transculturation" by Lat in American critics and 
writers and has been taken up by literary theorists such as Mary 
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Louise Pratt and Françoise Lionnet. In her study of travel writing 
and colonial encounters, Pratt argues that adopting a trans-
cultural approach allows for a contact perspective that fore-
grounds "the interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial 
encounters so easily ignored or suppressed by diffusionist ac-
counts of conquest and dominat ion" (7). A contact perspective, 
Pratt continues, "treats the relations among colonizers and colo-
nized . . . not in terms of separateness or apartheid, but in 
terms of copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings 
and practices, often within radically asymmetrical relations of 
power" (7). O f course, we should never lose sight o f asymmetri-
cal relations of power in any encounter between cultures, but a 
transcultural approach enables us to acknowledge as well that 
the subaltern culture is neither passive nor lacking in the power 
to resist, influence, or even redirect and shape the dominant 
culture. 
To Françoise Lionnet, the concept of transculturation pro-
vides us with "a new vocabulary for describing patterns of in-
fluence that are never unidirect ional" (103). She defines 
transculturation as "a process of cultural intercourse and ex-
change, a circulation of practices that creates a constant inter-
weaving of symbolic forms and empirical activities among the 
different cultures that interact with one another" ( 103-04). The 
transcultural approach as described by Pratt and L ionnet allows 
us, for example, not only to accept the conventional view that 
Afr ican slaves were assimilated to "white" Amer ican culture but 
also to comprehend the truth of Kwame Anthony Appiah's claim 
that "there is . . . no American culture without Afr ican roots" 
(qtd. i n L ionnet 102). 
Language provides us with the best example of transcultura-
tion at work. As the transculturalist par excellence, M ikha i l Bakh-
tin, puts it: ' The word in language is half someone else's" (293). 
Even a quick examination of the Engl ish language bears out 
Bakhtin's point, revealing the extent of the language's trans-
culturation. Words that we use in everyday life, such as "sham-
poo," "pajamas," and "ketchup," or an important newsworthy 
word such as "tariff," turn out to be transculturated words, words 
that have travelled from elsewhere and metamorphosed into 
Engl ish. 1 
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The point I wish to make, for the moment somewhat ellip-
tically, is this: adopting the stance of cultural relativism or separa-
tism leads to a problematic politics of identity, while choosing a 
transcultural approach leads to an empowering politics of articu-
lation (a concept that will be explained in more detail later in 
this essay). The debates that currently swirl around postcolonial 
theory, in my view, are debates over which approach to adopt or 
emphasize. It is to one of these debates that I now turn. 
II 
A central characteristic of postcolonial theory is its exertion of a 
certain historical vigilance, a wariness of all monocultural dis-
courses and their colonizing imperative. Postcolonial theory's 
suspicion of Western narratives of enlightenment and progress is 
matched equally by its resolve to not be taken in by imagined or 
invented national allegories of native authenticity. Postcolonial 
theory's critical vigilance, moreover, is directed against itself, 
such that its institutional and geopolitical locations, locutions, 
and interests are all brought into question. 
One of the questions postcolonial theory addresses to itself is 
that of its relation to its constituency, a question that quickly 
turns into the accusation that theory alienates itself from the very 
constituency on whose behalf it intervenes. In a somewhat sim-
plif ied and schematic manner, the problem can be described as 
the perceived gulf between a highly literate metropolitan theory, 
with its institutionally privileged enunciative positions and mo-
dalities, and the generally disadvantaged demotic speech of 
marginalized populations. Thus critics such as Benita Parry, T im-
othy Brennan, and Simon Dur ing have all questioned theory in 
the name of what can be called "demotic resistance." Parry, 
for example, has accused postcolonial theorists such as H o m i 
Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak of "an exorbitation of discourse" that 
is deaf to the "alternative text" of the native subaltern (43). In a 
similar vein, Brennan comments on theory's self-imposed dis-
tance from popular national resistance: "the increasing obtuse-
ness, increasingly mandarin quality of metropolitan theory was 
an indirect way of dealing with the threatening engagements of 
the decolonized intellectuals' quest for recognit ion" (103). The 
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most damaging accusation, however, comes from Dur ing , whose 
critical remarks on the irrelevance of postcolonial theory to 
indigenous struggles have already been cited here. 
It can be argued, however, against Parry, Brennan, and Dur ing , 
that their critical vigilance is in fact part of the problem they have 
defined so usefully. Their suspicion of postcolonial theory and 
their call for demotic resistance, after all , are couched in the 
same theoretical id iom and delivered from the same privileged 
locations as those of the postcolonial theorists they critique. 
There is, it seems to me, no way of avoiding such a performative 
contradiction as long as postcolonial theorists and their critics 
remain locked within the theoretical languages and institutional 
structures against which their vigilance is trained but from which 
their critical authority, their certification to speak, is none the 
less derived. As Vivek Dhareshwar points out, "[e]ven a discourse 
that claims to deconstruct the West's constructions of the Other 
has to still circulate in the discursive space of the West; it remains 
positioned in that discursive space and its problematics get de-
fined by the structure of address available i n that space" (150). 
Similarly, Gayatri Spivak admits to the aporia of her own critical 
position, of having to say " 'no ' to a structure, which one critiques, 
yet inhabits intimately" (225). 
I wish to argue that both postcolonial theory and its critiques 
land themselves in such a predicament because they reproduce 
in their arguments a stubbornly persistent binary opposition 
between the theoretical and the demotic, between theory's suspi-
c ion of the simplifications of collective identity and action and 
popular demotic resistance to the institutional and interpreta-
tive privileges accorded to theory. A n opposition of this k ind 
locks theory and theory's critiques into an unproductive cycle of 
vigilance, counter-vigilance, renewed vigilance, and so on. 
Postcolonial theory and its demotic critiques are compelled 
to adopt a strategy of vigilance because of a tendency, often 
overlooked, in both camps to privilege a politics based on the 
concept o f negative freedom. Negative freedom, a classic l iberal 
ideal, can be defined as the belief in absolute self-determination 
free from all external constraints, interferences, or influences. 2 
In demanding absolute autonomy, negative freedom activates a 
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hermeneutics of suspicion that rigorously tracks down and 
uncovers any form of external influence or pressure that may 
compromise the autonomy of an individual or group. Such a 
hermeneutics of suspicion finds common cause with a politics i n 
which identity remains autonomous and authentic by affirming 
its difference from others and by vigilandy guarding against 
external determinants. In relying heavily on a not ion of auton-
omy founded on difference, postcolonial theorists and their 
demotic opponents find themselves adopting a discourse in 
which identity is based on separation, demarcation, exclusion, 
and non-contamination, a discourse of autonomy in which the 
other is not yet a "possible basis for agreement" (Glissant 97). 
Thus, i n questioning the political and institutional motives of 
metropolitan postcolonial theory, critics such as Parry, Brennan, 
and Dur ing clearly seek to maintain, through the practice of 
separatist vigilance, what they regard as the autonomy and integ-
rity of demotic resistance. From the other side, the insistence on 
the authenticity of the resistant demotic or native voice appears 
curiously like an indulgence in what Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has 
called "the sentimental romance of alterity" (466). Yet even as 
postcolonial theorists accuse their demotic detractors of advocat-
ing the pure and autonomous identity of the other, their own 
accusation must assume a certain enunciative autonomy, an 
identity, however minimal , distancing it from the native or demo-
tic scene it questions. Thus, for instance, even as Edward Said 
criticizes "nativism" for seeking an illusory autonomy and prior-
ity of identity, the cosmopolitan and ironic view that enables his 
critique appears to insist on a detached and somewhat superior 
perspective far above the embattled and strident fray of compet-
ing standpoints (see Said 275-76). In other words, Said's cham-
p ion ing of cultural heteronomy and hybridity requires h im, 
paradoxically, to maintain the autonomy and purity of a free-
lance, exilic consciousness. As Said has remarked in an interview, 
"even in the case of the Palestinian movement itself I've made it a 
point never to accept an official role of any sort; I've always 
retained my independence" (qtd. i n McGowan 175). It appears 
that, for Said, the preservation of otherness in the same, of 
difference in identity, requires that the otherness or difference 
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of the critic be kept free and separate in itself. But, as J o h n 
McGowan points out in his critique of Said's valorization of 
oppositional otherness, "to imagine the other as distant and 
separate is profoundly undialectical . . . [since it] rests on an 
assumption of self-sufficiency, of an identity forged in the ab-
sence of social ties" ( 175) . Thus, taking an ironic turn, Said's 
suspicion of purist identity politics depends on his acceptance of 
the pure and autonomous oppositional identity of the critic. 
What should be clear, then, is that certain tendencies in post-
colonial theory and demotic critiques of postcolonial theory 
both readily assume a concept o f negative freedom, of autonomy 
from all external influences and relations, and thus find them-
selves locked into rigid oppositions that are then forced to exer-
cise vigilance against external threats to their autonomy. It may 
be more productive in the long run, however, to relax the opposi-
t ion and shift the emphasis from the defensive autonomy of 
negative freedom (freedom from) to a more open, a more re-
lational and positive version of freedom (freedom to), a free-
dom enabled rather than constrained by social relationships. To 
go beyond the ultimately paralyzing mode of theoretical self-
vigilance will require the thought of relationality or transcultura-
tion and the practice of articulation, the productive though 
always provisional and uncertain colligation of different ele-
ments. Stuart Ha l l , who has done much to promote the theory of 
articulation, defines it thus: 
In England, [articulation] has a nice double meaning because "artic-
ulate" means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate. .. . But we also 
speak of an "articulated" lorry: a lorry where the front and back can, 
but need not necessarily, be connected to one another. The two parts 
are connected to each other, but through a specific linkage that can 
be broken. An articulation is thus the form of the connection that can 
make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is 
a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential 
for all time. You have to ask, under what circumstance can a con-
nection be forged or made? So the so-called "unity" of a discourse 
is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which can 
be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary 
"belongingness." (53) 
Hall 's description of articulation allows us to rethink and re-
invent the possibility of linkage where opposition and difference 
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may seem only too firmly entrenched. Rather than falling into 
the frozen certainties of political identities or the stalemated 
opposition of different ideologies, the practice of articulation re-
opens the dimension of agency, change, risk, and uncertainty. In 
short, it enables us to make our own history even under condi-
tions not of our choosing. Thus, instead of privileging theory at 
the expense of the demotic or vice versa, or defending the purity 
of demotic resistance against the cosmopolitanism of theory or 
vice versa, or allowing the perceived antagonism between theory 
and the demotic to settle into an unavoidable aporia, we should 
attempt to grasp them relationally, placing and articulating them 
in the same space of struggle, judgment, and enunciation. H o m i 
Bhabha argues that such an emphasis on the activity of articulation 
produces a shift from "the negative dialectics of the 'symptoma-
tic reading' [or what I have called theoretical self-vigilance], to 
an attention to the place and time of the enunciative agency" 
("Postcolonial Authority" 57). The emphasis on agency and 
articulation allows us to go beyond vigilance, and the guilt and 
suspicion that generate vigilance, and to redirect our energies 
instead to the more difficult and uncertain task of cultural cre-
ation and collective social action. 
This is why I think social activists and politically engaged 
writers have been ahead of academics in their awareness of the 
need to question the strict separations necessary to the desire for 
absolute cultural or critical autonomy and to engage instead in 
the polit ical activity of articulation. I will thus turn to the work 
of Rigoberta Menchu, Edouard Glissant, and Ch inua Achebe 
and briefly sketch how I think they can help us end the rift be-
tween institutionally privileged discourses and the claims of the 
demotic. 
Ill 
The Nobe l Peace Prize winner of 1992, the Guatemalan Indian 
activist Rigoberta Menchu, ends her testimonio with these words: 
My commitment to our struggle knows no boundaries nor limits. This 
is why I've travelled to many places where I've had the opportunity to 
talk about my people. O f course, I'd need a lot of time to tell you all 
about my people, because it's not easy to understand just like that. 
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And I think I've given some idea of that in my account. Nevertheless, 
I'm still keeping my Indian identity a secret. I'm still keeping secret 
what I think no-one should know. Not even anthropologists or intel-
lectuals, no matter how many books they have, can find out all our 
secrets. (247) 
Though Menchu's insistence on safeguarding the autonomy and 
inviolability of her Indian identity comes through very clearly, it 
is important to note as well that she recognizes the need to 
publicize her people's plight and to gain the solidarity of others. 
Though rooted in a constituency, she also realizes that a wider 
audience is needed in the struggle waged for the survival of her 
people. Moreover, as George Yudice has pointed out, Menchu's 
affirmation of her Indian identity leads neither to essentialism 
nor to a "romanticized ancestral reconci l iat ion" because it is part 
of a "cultural and political practice necessary for survival" (226). 
This cultural and political practice requires Menchu to engage 
simultaneously in the defence of autonomous identity and the 
search for new articulations, for new forms o f political struggle. 
We see this when Menchu, i n order to preserve her Indian 
identity and the ways o f her ancestors, decides to j o in a national 
peasant organization thereby embracing, as she puts it, "other 
things, other ways" (149). Menchu's double strategy of defend-
ing autonomy through the practice o f social or political articula-
tion is also evident i n her attitude to education in general and the 
learning of Spanish in particular. Thus Menchu agrees with her 
father's warn ing—"My chi ldren, don' t aspire to go to school, 
because schools take our customs away from us" (169)—and 
adds, "even though a person may leam to read and write, he 
should not accept the false education they give our people. O u r 
people must not think as the authorities think. They must not let 
others think for them" ( 170). Yet Menchu's resistance to educa-
tion is a resistance to the hegemonic educational system imposed 
by the non-Indian central government in Guatemala. She does 
not abandon the idea of learning; nor does she deny the impor-
tance of learning Spanish. O n the contrary, Menchu says that 
although her life has taught her many things, "human beings are 
also made to learn many more" (162). Further, with a pragma-
tism born out of political activism, she adds: "Since Spanish was a 
language which united us [that is, the different Indian groups], 
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why learn all the twenty-two languages in Guatemala? It wasn't 
possible, and anyway this wasn't the moment to do i t . . . I learned 
Spanish out of necessity" (162). 
Menchu's participation i n a national peasant movement also 
taught her to see beyond cultural and ethnic oppositions, which, 
as often as not, are created by a shared history of political and 
material oppression. Thus, though Menchu proudly proclaims 
her native identity, she is not a naive nativist, for she also under-
stands that her own identity includes different elements, differ-
ent sub-constituencies, i f you wil l , and that she has to participate 
fully i n the struggle as "an Indian first, and then as a woman, a 
peasant, a Chr is t ian" (120). She also realizes that as a 
Guatemalan Indian she must try to articulate her struggle to that 
of the Spanish-speaking ladinos. Thus, in a moment of self-
reflection and self-critique, she remarks: 
As I was saying, I'm an Indian ist, not just an Indian. I'm an Indianist 
to my fingertips and I defend everything to do with my ancestors. But 
I didn't understand this in the proper way, because we can only 
understand when we start talking to each other. And this is the only 
way we can correct our ideas. Little by litüe, I discovered many ways in 
which we had to be understanding towards our ladino friends and in 
which they had to show us understanding too. Because I also knew 
companeros ladinos with whom we shared the worst conditions, but 
who still felt ladino, and as ladinos they didn't see that our poverty 
united us. But little by litde, both they and I began discussing many 
very important things and saw that the root of our problems lay in the 
ownership of the land. All our country's riches are in the hands of the 
few. (166) 
The most important lesson we can learn from Menchu's testi-
mony is that the struggle to preserve the autonomy of cultural 
identity may require a further thinking beyond autonomy to-
wards social and polit ical articulation; or, as Menchu puts it, "we 
have to erase the barriers which exist between ethnic groups, 
between Indians and ladinos, between men and women, between 
intellectuals and non-intellectuals, and between all the linguistic 
areas" (233). 
I V 
Like Menchu, the Martinican writer and critic Edouard Glissant 
advocates resistance to the "all-encompassing world of cultural 
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sameness, effectively imposed by the West." He too asserts the 
importance of preserving the identity of one's culture from that 
"universal humanism that incorporates all (national) peculiari-
ties" (97). Thus, l ike Menchu, Glissant initially calls for a pro-
tective vigilance, for "[a]n identity on its guard, in which the 
relationship with the Other shapes the self without fixing it 
under an oppressive force. That is what we see everywhere in the 
world: each people wants to declare its own identity" (169). 
Again, however, l ike Menchu, Glissant affirms the autonomy of 
cultural identity precisely in order to open it out to a world 
of cultural diversity and cultural interchange, to what Glissant 
terms the recognition of " la Relat ion" (xii). Thus, even as Glis-
sant asserts the need for "an awareness of our place in the world," 
he also adds that we must reflect "on the necessary and dis-
alienated relationship with the Other " (169). Autonomy once 
attained, i n Glissant's view, should not lead to isolation or separa-
tion but to a poetics of productive relationships and creative 
articulations. As he puts it, "[t]o declare one's identity is to write 
the world into existence" (169). 
Glissant's views on creolization are instructive i n this regard. 
Glissant approaches Mart inican Creole without any romantic 
illusions about its status as both a language of resistance and a 
language of powerlessness. Creole as a language of resistance is 
also Creole as powerless language. What does Glissant mean by 
this? First of all , Creole, i n its present form in Martinique, is an 
anti- or counter-language. It is a language that produces through 
"fits and starts . . . an attempt to deny the Other's total and 
corrosive ho l d " (159). The Other, of course, is the colonizer's 
language, French. L ike his fellow countryman, Frantz Fanon, 
Glissant is aware that France's granting of citizenship, o f départe-
ment status, to Martinique is a concession and an imposit ion that 
has trapped Martinicans i n greater dependency and that the 
only response to such a "benevolent" imposit ion is to resist it. As 
Glissant puts it, 
[t]he only source of light ultimately was that of the transcendental 
presence of the Other, of his Visibility—colonizer or administra-
tor—of his transparency fatally proposed as a model, because of 
which we have acquired a taste for obscurity, and for me the need to 
TOWARDS ARTICULATION 179 
seek out obscurity, that which is not obvious, to assert for each 
community the right to a shared obscurity. (161) 
As an obscurity directed at the dominant Other, Creole is a 
language o f resistance. As Glissant goes on to argue, however, to 
base the identity of Creole solely on resistance, on a form of 
negative freedom, is to declare in a sense its powerlessness; it is to 
base identity on reaction to the Other rather than action for 
oneself. Thus Creole as linguistic or poetic resistance "will be 
insignificant unless it is an integral part of a resolute collective 
a c t — a political act" (163). That resolute collective act implies 
not only Martinique's political self-determination but also Marti-
nique's cultural emancipation from France. Such a cultural l ib-
eration would require, as a first step, the transformation of 
Creole from an anti- or counter-language based on resistance to 
French to a Creole that can affirm and celebrate its own identity 
without having to defer to, and thus without having to resist, the 
authority of French. In other words, Glissant wants to replace the 
negative reactional freedom, on which Creole's present linguis-
tic identity is based, with a more positive concept of freedom that 
affirms Creole's identity as diversity and not as a language that 
has failed to attain purity. As Glissant explains, 
[t]he idea of creolization demonstrates that henceforth it is no 
longer valid to glorify "unique" origins that the race safeguards and 
prolongs. . . . To assert peoples are creolized, that creolization has 
value, is to deconstruct in this way the category of "creolized" that is 
considered as halfway between two "pure" extremes.... Creolization 
as an idea means the negation of creolization as a category [that is, 
the category of Creole as impure French, a category imposed by the 
French and tacidy accepted by Martinicans in their use of it to resist 
official French], by giving priority to the notion of natural creoliza-
tion, which the human imagination has always wished to deny or 
disguise (in Western tradition). (140-41) 
Glissant's rethinking of creolization allows h im, therefore, to see 
cultural or linguistic identity as multiply determined, as always-
already transculturated. One's cultural or linguistic autonomy is 
thus, for Glissant, never fixed and isolated but always an ongoing 
articulation of differences. One of these differences that has 
been articulated i n Creole, not as an instance of a pure or 
superior identity but as merely another equal element i n a new 
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collectively formed language, is French. In Glissant's words: "If, 
therefore, when we deal with our own history, we adopt (we 
Caribbean people) the various European languages and adapt 
them, no one wil l teach us how to do this. We wil l perhaps be the 
ones to teach others a new poetic and, leaving behind the poetics 
of not-knowing [or the counter poetics of a counter-language], 
wil l initiate others into a new chapter i n the history of mank ind " 
(169). 
Following Glissant's lead, members of a younger generation of 
writers, Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau, and Raphael Con-
fiant, in their manifesto "In Praise o f Creoleness," argue that 
Creoleness is always-already transcultural or translingual: 
Creoleness is not monolingual. Nor is its multilingualism divided 
into isolated compartments. Its field is language. Its appetite: all the 
languages of the world. The interaction of many languages (the 
points where they meet and relate) is a polysonic vertigo Living at 
once the poetics of all languages is not just enriching each of them, 
but also, and above all, breaking the customary order of these lan-
guages, reversing their established meanings. (901) 
Glissant, Bernabé, et al., therefore, repudiate the binary opposi-
t ion that would put Creole i n its demotic place and install French 
on the plane of h igh culture and argue instead for a Creole that 
articulates linguistic relationships i n all kinds of unsuspected 
ways, as Glissant explains: 
It is the unknown area of these relationships that weaves, while 
dismantling the conception of the standard language, the "natural 
texture" of our new baroque, our own. Liberation will emerge from 
this cultural composite. The "function" of Creole languages, which 
must resist the temptation of exclusivity, manifests itself in this pro-
cess, far removed from the . . . fire of the melting-pot. (250) 
V 
Glissant's meditations on the diversity that constitutes cul-
tural, national, or linguistic identity are very similar to Ch inua 
Achebe's concerns i n his novel Anthills of the Savannah. Indeed, 
Achebe's rethinking of postcolonial national identity in this 
novel could well be summed up by Glissant's remark that " [ d i -
versity needs the presence of peoples, no longer as objects to be 
swallowed up, but with the intention of creating a new relation-
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ship" (98). Anthills of the Savannah describes the dissolution of an 
authoritarian nationalist discourse no longer i n touch with the 
realities of the common people and shows how that dissolution 
leads to the political awakening of the novel's three main charac-
ters, Chris Or iko , Ikem Osodi , and Beatrice Nwanyibuife, who 
begin to unlearn their own isolated elitist premises and privi-
leges. A l l three characters, highly placed in the social hierarchy, 
undergo a transformation as they shed their "been-to" stance 
of superiority as graduates of L ondon University. A l l three be-
come "wide-eyed newcomer[s] " (201) to the ways of their own 
country, a fictional West African State named Kangan. Far from 
being the administrators and intellectuals who have the knowl-
edge to guide their society, they learn, to their surprise and 
humility, that they are alienated from their own people and that 
they have to be taught the demotic wisdom they have so long 
ignored. Thus Chris, for example, in his flight from the country's 
dictator, his former classmate, Sam, has to be instructed in the art 
of street survival by the taxi-driver Bra imoh. Recognizing the 
value of the instruction he has received, Chris says humbly to 
Bra imoh: ' Thank y o u . . . I must remember that To succeed as 
small man no be small th ing" ( 194). 
The novel argues that for too long the dominant nationalist 
discourse of Kangan has centred around an elite male clique that 
has claimed to represent the nation; but as Beatrice angrily 
reminds Chris: "Well, you fellows all three of you [Chris, Ikem 
and the dictator, Sam], are incredibly conceited. The story of this 
country, as far as you are concerned, is the story of the three of 
you" (66). In turn, Beatrice learns that the national discourse 
should include not only educated women l ike her but also the 
likes of Ikem's half-literate mistress, Elewa, and Beatrice's own 
Christian maid, Agatha ( 184-85). The failure of Kangan nation-
alist discourse is therefore the failure of its exclusions, the fail-
ure, as Ikem observes, "of our rulers to re-establish vital inner 
links with the poor and dispossessed of this country" (141). We 
must note, however, that the novel's increasing inclusion of the 
voices of the poor and dispossessed and of the p idgin they use 
does not lead to a rejection of the intellectual's role in society. 
The intellectual, to be sure, is no longer the centre o f authority. 
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Yet, at the same time, the intellectual becomes part of a new 
articulation of national identity and authority. I want to look at 
two set pieces in the novel in which this new articulation takes 
place. 
The first is Ikem Osodi's lecture to a university audience i n 
which he recounts the Abazón Elder's fable "The Tortoise and 
the Leopard" as an example of polit ical struggle. Though Ikem's 
use of the Elder's fable reveals his respect for the traditional lore 
of his people, his respect does not condemn the fable to a quaint 
folklorist status; in Ikem's retel l ing there is no ideology of sal-
vage, no attempt at preserving the exotic elements o f the tale. 
The traditional tale is adapted by Ikem for a modern university 
audience, and in the process an articulation is achieved l ink ing 
the Abazonian struggle to the problems besetting Kangan society 
as a whole. Moreover, the work of articulation is not solely that of 
the intellectual. The Abazonian Elder, in tell ing Ikem the story i n 
the first place, shows his awareness that the tale would travel well 
and that, through Ikem, he can l ink his Abazonian constituency 
to a more diverse Kangan audience. The Elder 's understanding 
that Abazonian identity depends on articulation rather than 
separation or isolation from the rest of Kangan is expressed 
clearly when he rebukes one of his fellow Abazonians for criticiz-
ing Ikem's absence from Abazonian social ceremonies: 
"Go on with your meetings and marriages and naming ceremonies 
because it is good to do so. But leave this young man alone to do what 
he is doing for Abazón and for the whole of Kangan; the cock that 
crows in the morning belongs to one household but his voice is the 
property of the neighbourhood. You should be proud that this bright 
cockerel that wakes the whole village comes from your compound." 
(122) 
Ikem's lecture at the university thus provides an example of a 
successful articulation of the traditional and the modern, the 
regional and the national, the demotic and the academic. It is 
possible, Achebe appears to be saying, for the intellectual to 
remain an intellectual and yet learn from the people and be of 
service to the people. The intellectual is most herself or himself 
when she or he becomes a model o f social articulation; as Ikem 
Osodi puts it, 
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"There seems no way I can become like the poor except by faking. 
What I know, I know for good or ill. So for good or ill I shall remain 
myself, but with this deliberate readiness now to help and be helped. 
Like those complex, multivalent atoms in Biochemistry books. I have 
arms that reach out in all directions—a helping hand, a hand 
signalling for help." (142) 
The other example of social articulation occurs at the end of the 
novel, i n which Beatrice holds a naming ceremony for the baby 
daughter of Elewa and the murdered Ikem. The gathering can 
be read as Achebe's re-imagining of the Nigerian nation, a re-
imagining in which differences are included and articulated in 
new and creative ways and not simply el ided as they would have 
been in an elitist, masculinist nationalism. The gathering illus-
trates Glissant's statement that "the nation is not based on exclu-
sion; it is a form of disalienated relationship with the other, who 
in this way becomes our fellow m a n " (250). A t the naming 
ceremony we find different ethnic groups, Moslem and Chris-
tian, men and women, o ld and young. Moreover, the gathering, 
which is described as an "ecumenical fraternization" (224), 
though traditional i n its observation of ritual, is also innovative in 
that Beatrice gives the baby girl a boy's name: Amaechina, "May-
the-path-never-close" (222). The name is conferred at a tradi-
tional ceremony; but, in turn, through Beatrice's uncoupl ing of 
name and gender, tradition is transformed, given new life and re-
oriented towards the future—"May-the-path-never-close." This 
simultaneous observation and transformation o f tradition is 
what Elewa's roguish o ld uncle admires when he says, 
"Do you know why I am laughing like this? I am laughing because in 
you young people our world has met its match. Yes! You have put the 
world where it should sit. . . . My wife here was breaking her head 
looking for kolanuts, for alligator pepper, for honey and for bitter 
leaf.... And while she is cracking her head you people gather in this 
whiteman house and give the girl a boy's name. . . . That is how to 
handle this world." (227) 
Again, what we have in the uncle's guarded approval of Beatrice's 
action is a recognition of the need for articulation between the 
generations, between the genders, between the past and the 
present, between the o ld medicine-man uncle and Beatrice, the 
London University graduate with a "walloping honours degree in 
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Eng l i sh" (62). In a recent interview, Achebe describes his own 
practice of articulation in the following way: "We do have several 
traditions. We have the indigenous tradition, the oral tradition, 
the vernaculars, the ancient tradition of literature before, but we 
also have today. You can't disappear back into the past, so we 
need to create a synthesis of these two. That is the issue" ("Inter-
view" 79-80). 
VI 
With the examples o f Menchu, Glissant, and Achebe in mind , in 
conclusion I would like to return to Simon During's remark that 
postcolonial theory "does not appeal to those closest to the 
cont inuing struggle against white dominat ion" (348) and that 
there is no word in Maor i for "postcolonialism." During 's remark 
is useful in cautioning us against postcolonial theory's ambition 
to be the avant-garde of polit ical struggle. But, from the point of 
view that I have adopted in this essay, During's comment is 
problematic not only because it assumes, rather patronizingly, to 
know the real interests of the Maoris but, more importandy, 
because it forecloses the possibility of articulating local Maor i 
struggles to a wider national or transnational arena of struggle, 
thereby disallowing the possibility o f forging larger solidarities, 
stronger political blocs. It seems to me that i f postcolonial theory 
should learn, as Dur ing righdy suggests, to curb its ambition and 
recognize that the discursive ambiguities and complexities it 
so elegandy formulates must be tempered by the cruder and 
harsher but no less ambiguous and complex demands of local 
political struggles, then it is equally the case that local political 
activists may find the arguments and strategies of postcolonial 
theorists to be o f some use in their struggle. Thus, contra Dur ing , 
it can be argued that although "postcolonialism" may not exist in 
the lexicon of Koor i and Maor i activists, its addition may be 
welcomed by those activists i f only because it widens the scope of 
their struggle and adds to their arsenal of strategies. 
Why, then, does Dur ing insist on keeping metropolitan post-
colonial theory separate from Maor i polit ical activism? It is, I 
suspect, pardy because he fears that any contact between the two 
will result in an unequal exchange leading to the co-optation of 
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the latter by the former. A r i f D i r l ik expresses a similar concern 
in his critique of postcolonial theory when he argues that the 
postcolonial valorization of hybridity conceals an asymmetry of 
power relations that favours metropolitan-based postcolonial 
intellectuals. Yet although Dir l ik is right in insisting that "not all 
positions are equal in power" (343), both he and Dur ing under-
estimate the ability o f the "weaker" party to confront, appropri-
ate, change, and adapt the dominant discourse to suit its own 
needs. Thus, while Dir l ik and Dur ing can only observe the silenc-
ing of the subaltern demotic voice by metropolitan theory, the 
assimilation of the other into the same, a more sensitive analysis 
can detect subtle ways in which the subaltern other can take up 
the dominant discourse and, through a process of critical mimi-
cry, work its changes on that discourse. As H o m i Bhabha points 
out, when a statement from one institution is transcribed in the 
discourse of another, a process of destabilization and innovation 
occurs, since "any change in the statement's conditions of use 
and reinvestment, any alteration i n its field of experience or 
verification, or indeed any difference in the problems to be 
solved, can lead to the emergence of a new statement: the differ-
ence o f the same" (The Location of Culture 22). According to 
Bhabha's analysis, concern over the metropolitan co-optation 
and assimilation of the subaltern is challenged by the subaltern's 
subversive mimicry—fear over the making same of the different 
mocked by the making different of the same. In his study of how 
the Kwaios of the Solomon Islands resisted Brit ish colonialism, 
Roger Keesing usefully reminds us that "[e]ven when they ap-
pear to be appropriating the structures and categories and logics 
of colonial discourse, subaltern peoples progressively but ulti-
mately radically transform them, in the very process of transgres-
sion and in their deployment in a counter hegemonic political 
struggle" (238).3 
However politically well-intentioned, the desire to protect the 
subaltern demotic voice from metropolitan theory, ironically, 
can end up preventing the establishment of coevalness between 
the two. In seeking to defend the subaltern other's autonomy, 
metropolitan critics like Dur ing find themselves implicated in 
the very situation of dominance they wish to dismande. By their 
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logic, the subaltern's autonomy is predicated on the subaltern's 
unchanging structural position as the other o f the West. How-
ever, this "othering," which ensures the subaltern's autonomy, 
also betrays the vulnerability of subaltern identity, its problematic 
unchanging role as reactive opposition to active Western domi-
nation, for, as Bhabha has warned, "the site o f cultural difference 
can become the mere phantom of a dire disciplinary struggle i n 
which it has no space or power [and in which] the Other text is 
forever the exegetical horizon of difference, never the active 
agent of art iculation" (The Location of Culture 31). Asked to 
function as the deconstrucdve l imit o f Western knowledge, the 
subaltern other, more often than not, is constructed into being 
by dissenting factions of the West. As such, the other is frozen in 
an antithetical, adversarial role, its identity forever dependent on 
its difference from the West. Essentialized and preserved in 
theoretical aspic, the other is made to function as the conscience 
of the West, turned into an al lochronic entity whose history is 
controlled by the deconstrucdve needs of the Western academy 
rather than its own. Coeval historical agency, innovation, and 
change are denied to the other in order that it can remain 
forever as the limit-text o f the West. Thus, whenever a non-
Western subaltern other is told not to take up Western knowl-
edges or discourses because to do so would be to betray his or her 
indigenous culture, what some anthropologists have called "the 
salvage paradigm" is activated and the model indigenous culture 
is denied historical agency in order that it can be salvaged and 
displayed in all its purity and autonomy by and for the West. 
Is there a Maor i word for "postcolonialism"? The answer, I 
hope it is clear, should not be "no and there is no need for such a 
word," but "not yet." Depending on Maor i needs, "postcolonial-
i sm" may well become a loan word inserted into the Maor i 
lexicon, a metropolitan word that wil l become locally inflected, 
ceding its identity as it becomes articulated to Maor i exigencies. 
A continent away from the Maor i struggle, the Mayan peasants o f 
Chiapas launched their rebel l ion on the same New Year's day 
that the Nor th American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took 
effect. N A F T A entered the lexicon of the Zapatista rebels be-
cause they understood that the struggle for their indigenous 
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rights and for their very l ivel ihood had to be engaged not only on 
die ir own local ground but also on a nation-wide and transna-
tional basis. Shedding the image of what A lc ida Ramos has called 
"the hyperreal Indian," the Indian created in the image of pre-
dominandy white-staffed indigenist movements—"[the Indian 
who is] dependent, suffering, a victim of the system, innocent 
of bourgeois evils, honourable in his actions and intentions, 
and preferably exotic" (163)—the Mayan rebels of Chiapas 
launched what Roger Bürbach has called a "postmodern rebel-
l i o n " ( 113). They skilfully uti l ized the media for their own ends; 
and Bürbach reports that when he visited the region with an 
international delegation in March, 1994, a few months after 
the uprising, he was struck by the sophisticated nature of their 
demands: 
In a meeting with many of the community members, it was striking 
that the women's organization took the lead in discussing the com-
munity's needs and plans as well as the obstacles it faced. They 
wanted decent schools, medical services, assistance so they could 
attend nearby technical colleges, and the right to elect their own 
representatives at the municipal and state level. They also wanted 
lands from the nearby cattle estate to augment production . . . but 
were fully cognizant of the fact that these lands could only be farmed 
with appropriate technologies to avoid impoverishing the delicate 
soil of the region. (123-24) 
The Chiapas uprising proves that in order for subaltern or domi-
nated peoples to be other than objects of study or recipients of 
action by well-meaning postcolonial theorists, rock stars, or met-
ropolitan political activists, they must be seen as they see them-
selves—not as isolated, vulnerable peoples (though they can be 
that too) whose authentic way of life needs to be protected, 
preserved, or salvaged by external powers but as theoretical and 
cultural coevals and co-actors who are interested in metropolitan 
knowledges, techniques, and goods and who can freely articulate 
these with their own local, historical needs and practices. As 
Rigoberto Menchu puts it, arguing for resistance as articulated 
action rather than piecemeal reaction, "we need to be on the 
constant lookout for new techniques . . . everything must have a 
reason or we might do things we want to, but without knowing 
why we're doing them" (130). 
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N O T E S 
1 "Shampoo" comes from the Hindi verb champna ("to press") and its familiar 
imperative, champo. "Pajamas" is derived from the Hindi word for a type of loose 
trousers, pajama, itself borrowed from the Persian compound word made up of pai 
("foot") and jamah ("garment clothing"). "Ketchup" travelled into English from a 
Chinese regional dialect term for shellfish sauce—Kae ("shellfish" or "seafood") 
and tsiap (*%rine" or "sauce"). Finally, "tariff" comes from a Turkish variant of the 
Arabic word tarif ("notification, explanation"). For extended discussions of the 
etymology of these and other transculturated words in English, see Louis G. Heller, 
et al., The Private Lives of English Words. 
2 For an excellent critique of the uses of negative freedom in postmodern and 
postcolonial criticism, see John McGowan's Postmodernism and its Critics, especially 
Chapter Three. 
3 In a similar vein, Anuradha Dingwaney Needham has argued that C. L. R.James 
critically appropriated the colonial sport of cricket and turned it into a symbol of 
West Indian self-determination: 
By seizing upon a symbol of English (i.e., the colonizer's) national character— 
cricket—to represent West Indian (i.e., the colonized's) self-definition, James, 
in effect, abducts "Englishness" (as defined by cricket) and makes it not the 
exclusive property of the colonizers but rather the means by which the colonized 
peoples of the Caribbean set themselves free. (288) 
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